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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
(BPCIA), enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), created an abbreviated pathway for the
1
FDA to approve biosimilars. This legislation broadly complements
the twenty-five-year-old Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (generally referred to as the Hatch-Waxman
2
Act), which provides a clear path for generic drug entry in the case
of new chemical entities (NCEs) approved under the Food, Drug,
3
and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) through the Abbreviated New Drug
4
Application (ANDA) process. Through the ANDA process, generic
drugs demonstrated to be bioequivalent to off-patent reference drugs
5
may be approved without the submission of clinical-trial data. The
Hatch-Waxman Act, however, does not apply to most large-molecule
biologic medicines, which generally are regulated under the Public
Health Service Act and had no corresponding provision to the ANDA
6
prior to passage of the BPCIA. Although some biologics were approved under the FD&C Act for historical reasons, and therefore already exposed to potential generic competition, most biotech drugs

1

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
7001–03, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010) [hereinafter BPCIA]. Applications under this
pathway are to demonstrate that “the biological product is biosimilar to the reference product,” utilizing the same mechanism(s) of action as the reference product
(if known), and is to be used for the same condition(s) with the same route of administration, dose, and strength as the reference product. § 7002.
2
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
3
Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 355
(Supp. IV 2010)).
4
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j).
5
To obtain approval of an ANDA, manufacturers must establish that the generic
drug product is bioequivalent to the reference drug and has the same active ingredient(s), route of administration, dosage form, strength, previously approved conditions of use, and labeling (with some exceptions). § 355(j)(2)(A). Bioequivalence is
defined as “the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the
active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical
alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action when administered at the
same molar dose under similar conditions in an appropriately designed study” (with
some exceptions). 21 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2010). For bioequivalence to be established,
the pharmacokinetic studies should find that the generic product is within a confidence interval of 80% to 125% of the branded drug in terms of bioequivalence (a
non-binding recommendation). U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES
FOR ORALLY ADMINISTERED DRUG PRODUCTS—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 20 (2003),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/Guidances/ucm070124.pdf.
6
See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (Supp. IV 2010).
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will face competition from products coming to market through an
expedited approval process—relying at least in part on the innovator’s package of data and/or a prior FDA approval for the first time
7
as a result of the BPCIA.
Some of the key provisions of the new legislation are:
Similarity and Interchangeability: A biosimilar does not have to be
chemically identical to its reference product, but there must be “no
clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of safety, purity, and
8
potency.” The FDA can find that a biosimilar is interchangeable with
its reference product if it can be shown that switching between the
products produces no additional risk in terms of safety or efficacy
9
beyond that posed by the reference product alone. The first biosimilar shown to be interchangeable is entitled to a one-year exclusivity
period during which no other product may be deemed interchange10
able with the same reference product.
Regulatory Review: The FDA will determine whether a product is
biosimilar to a reference product based on analytical, animal-based,
and clinical studies (including the assessment of immunogenicity and
11
pharmacokinetics or pharmacodynamics). The FDA may waive the
12
need for any of these studies in individual cases. The FDA may, but
is not required to, conduct rulemaking or issue guidance before re13
viewing or approving a specific application. It may also conclude
that based on the state of science and experience, biosimilars to cer14
tain products or in a certain class of products will not be approved.

7

The FDA’s review and eventual approval of two “biosimilar-like” applications
were both for products approved under the FD&C Act: an ANDA for enoxaparin sodium, referencing Sanofi-Aventis’s Lovenox, and a § 505(b)(2) application for Omnitrope. See infra Part III.A.
8
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2010).
9
§ 262(i)(3).
10
§ 262(k)(6). Other litigation-related provisions apply. Exclusivity is the earliest of: one year after the first commercial marketing for the first-approved biosimilar
found to be interchangeable; or 18 months after a final court decision, including appeal on all patents in a suit against the first interchangeable biologic, or the dismissal
of a suit against the first interchangeable biologic; or 42 months after the approval of
the first interchangeable biologic if litigation is still ongoing; or 18 months after approval of the first interchangeable biologic if the applicant has not been sued. Id.
11
§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I).
12
§ 262(k)(2)(A)(ii).
13
§ 262(k)(8). The FDA may issue general or class-specific standards or guidelines (as the European Medicines Agency does) after a public comment period, but it
is not required to do so. Id. If the FDA issues guidelines, it must include the criteria
it will use to determine interchangeability and similarity. Id.
14
§ 262(k)(8)(E).
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Exclusivity for the Innovative Biologic: Biosimilar applications may
be submitted beginning four years after FDA approval of the refer15
ence innovative product. Before the FDA can approve a biosimilar
using the abbreviated pathway, however, there is a twelve-year period
16
of exclusivity following FDA approval of the innovative biologic. An
additional six months of exclusivity is available for the reference innovative biologic if pediatric-study requirements are met, which ap17
plies to both the four- and twelve-year exclusivity periods. There has
been controversy surrounding the most appropriate terminology for
these provisions and discussion regarding the Congressional intent of
the innovator biologic exclusivity periods in the BPCIA. Therefore,
in this Article, we refer to the four-year, twelve-year, and six-month
exclusivity periods defined in the statute collectively, simply as newbiologic-entity exclusivity (NBE exclusivity) and to new innovative
18
(rather than interchangeable or biosimilar) biologics as NBEs.
Anti-Evergreening Provisions: Several types of licensures or approvals are not eligible for NBE exclusivity, including: (1) a supplemental
biologics license application (sBLA) for the reference biologic product; (2) a subsequent BLA filed by the same sponsor, manufacturer,
or other related entity as the reference biologic product that does not
include structural changes in a biologic’s formulation (i.e., a new indication, route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, deli15

§ 262(k)(7)(B).
§ 262(k)(7)(A).
17
§ 262(m).
18
In a recent letter to the FDA, members of Congress noted that these provisions
should be distinguished from and do not offer “market exclusivity for innovator
products,” which would “prohibit or prevent another manufacturer from developing
its own data to justify FDA approval of a similar or competitive product.” Letter from
Representatives Anna Eshoo, Jay Inslee & Joe Barton, U.S. House of Representatives,
to the Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/
EIB%20Ltr%20FDA%20DEC%202010.pdf. A letter using similar language was submitted by several senators, stating that “It (the Act) does not prohibit or prevent
another manufacturer from developing its own data to justify FDA approval of a full
biologics license application rather than an abbreviated application that relies on the
prior approval of a reference product.” Letter from Senators Kay Hagan, Orrin
Hatch, Michael Enzi & John Kerry, U.S. Senate, to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r,
Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/1-711%20Senate%20Biologics%20letter%20to%20FDA.pdf. A third letter was submitted to the FDA by several other senators, noting their opposition to “statutory interpretations which, if implemented by the FDA, could result in generic competition
being delayed well beyond the 12 year exclusivity period in statute.” Letter from
Senators Sherrod Brown, John McCain, Charles Schumer & Tom Harkin, U.S. Senate, to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., (Jan. 24, 2011),
available
at
http://www.hpm.com/pdf/1-24-11%20BPCIA%20Excl%20Letter%
20to%20Hamburg.pdf.
16
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very system, delivery device, or strength); or (3) a subsequent BLA
filed by the same sponsor, manufacturer, or other related entity as
the reference biologic product and reflecting structural changes in a
biologic’s formulation that does not result in improved safety, purity,
19
or potency.
Reimbursement: A potential disincentive for biosimilar adoption
is mitigated by setting the reimbursement for a biosimilar under
Medicare Part B at the sum of its Average Selling Price (ASP) and six
20
percent of the ASP of the biological reference product.
Patent Provisions: The BPCIA requires a series of potentially
complex private information exchanges among the biosimilar applicant, reference product sponsor, and patent owners, followed by ne21
gotiations and litigation, if necessary. In contrast to the patent provisions for new chemical entities under the Hatch-Waxman Act, there
is no public listing akin to the Orange Book, no thirty-month stay
when a patent infringement suit is brought, and no 180-day exclusivity awarded to the first firm to file an abbreviated application and
22
achieve a successful Paragraph IV patent challenge.
In this Article, we consider a number of demand- and supplyside economic factors that will affect how competition between
branded biologics and biosimilars may evolve over the foreseeable future. These factors are based on current market dynamics, the provisions of the new law, initial European biosimilar experience, and experience under the Hatch-Waxman Act, taking into account
differences between biologics and chemically-synthesized drugs and
between the two regulatory frameworks.
Biologics are typically more complex molecules than smallmolecule chemical drugs. They are not manufactured through clinical synthesis but instead, are produced through biological processes
involving manipulation of genetic material and large-scale cultures of
living cells, where even small changes to the manufacturing process
23
can lead to significant changes in safety and efficacy. As a result, establishing that a biosimilar is “similar enough” to achieve comparable
therapeutic effects in patients is a much more challenging task for

19

§ 262(k)(7)(C).
Id. § 1395w-3a(b)(8).
21
Id. § 262(l).
22
Id. § 355(j); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A) (2010).
23
See Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-on Biologics: How Will it Evolve?,
25 HEALTH AFFS. 1291, 1291–1301 (2006).
20
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companies and regulators than establishing bioequivalence for gener24
ic chemical entities.
FDA regulatory requirements for biosimilar approval will affect
the investment necessary to gain market approval, the number of potential competitors, and how competition will evolve in terms of both
25
price and product differentiation. Other important factors influencing market competition include reimbursement for, and access to,
biosimilars by government and private insurers, as well as patent disclosure and resolution provisions, and future intellectual property lit26
igation. NBE exclusivity provisions in the new Act will have a longterm impact on incentives for investment in innovation and the de27
velopment of new biologic therapies. As with any new legislation, a
24
Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in the United States:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health, and H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th
Cong. 22 (2007) (statement of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Deputy Comm’r, Chief Med.
Officer,
FDA),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/
ucm154017.htm; Asher Mullard, Hearing Shines Spotlight on Biosimilar Controversies, 9
NAT. REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 905, 905–06 (2010). On the one hand, subtle changes in
manufacturing have resulted in changes in the characteristics of finished product:
Raptiva produced according to the same protocol by Genentech, and its partner
XOMA exhibited different pharmacokinetic profiles; Genzyme’s scale-up for Myozyme from 160 liters to a 2,000 liter production capacity was associated with glycosylation profile changes, resulting in a separate BLA requirement for the 2,000 liter
product; the introduction of an uncoated rubber stopper in the prefilled syringes for
Eprex is thought to have been associated with a number of cases of red blood cell
aplasia. See, e.g., Katia Boven et al., The Increased Incidence of Pure Red Cell Aplasia with
an Eprex Formulation in Uncoated Rubber Stopper Syringes, 67 KIDNEY INT’L 2346 (2005)
(scientific study finding that the use of rubber syringe stoppers was associated with an
increased incidence of pure red cell aplasia with Eprex); Genentech and XOMA Obtain
Results from Xanelim™ (Efalizumab) Pharmacokinetic Study, GENENTECH (Apr. 5, 2002),
http://www.gene.com/gene/news/press-releases/display.do?method=detail
&id=4947; Myozyme Produced at the 2000 L Bioreactor Scale to Receive Accelerated Approval,
UNITED POMPE FOUNDATION (Feb. 28, 2009), http://www.unitedpompe.com/
articles2.cfm?Article_Selected=528. Others have cited Amgen’s change in manufacturing process from the previous “roller ball” manufacturing process to a bioreactor
process and associated change in master cell bank for Aranesp, which entailed a new
Phase III study and significant Phase IV post-marketing study follow-up. See Interview
with Mark McCamish, Global Head of Biopharmaceutical Dev., Sandoz Int’l, available
at
http://www.iirusa.com/upload/wysiwyg/2010-P-Div/P1586/Podcast/Podcast
Script_MarkMcCamish.pdf. On the other hand, not all changes that might appear to
be significant ex ante prove to have a significant clinical effect; in gaining approval
for Avonex, Biogen was able to rely on clinical studies conducted in entirely different
cell lines (Biogen produced Avonex in a unique CHO cell line). See Günter Blaich et
al., Overview: Differentiating Issues in the Development of Macromolecules Compared with
Small Molecules, in HANDBOOK OF PHARM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 109–10 (Shane Cox Gad
ed., 2007).
25
See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1294.
26
See id. at 1295–98.
27
Id. at 1298–99.
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range of strategic responses by manufacturers of innovative biologics
and biosimilars will emerge. In this Article, we examine each of these
interrelated factors as they affect supply- and demand-side incentives.
II. FDA REGULATIONS AND THE EXPENSE OF DEVELOPING
A BIOSIMILAR
The new law authorizing biosimilars gives broad latitude to the
FDA to define the process and standards it will apply to biosimilar28
marketing approvals. FDA decisions will have an impact on both the
demand for, and supply, of biosimilars:
• The level of clinical trial and other evidence required to
establish either interchangeability or similarity will affect
not only regulatory approval but also adoption, as greater
levels of evidence will increase physician, payer, and patient confidence in a biosimilar medicine. As a result,
the level of evidence required will have an impact on the
costs of market entry, number of biosimilar entrants, and
29
assets and capabilities required to compete successfully;
• Naming conventions and pharmacovigilance requirements for biosimilars will have an impact on entry and
perceptions of substitutability by physicians, payers, and
30
patients;
• Whether data on one indication can be extrapolated to
others—absent additional clinical trials in that patient
population—safely and without creating a potential for
“off-label” liability will have an impact on entry decisions,
31
perceptions of substitutability, and biosimilar uptake;
• Definitions of what will constitute changes in “safety, purity, or potency,” as they are applied to determine whether
NBE exclusivity is to be authorized for next-generation

28

42 U.S.C. § 262(a), (k)(3)–(6), (k)(8) (Supp. IV 2010).
See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1296–98. This includes whether foreign
data will be accepted that use non-U.S.-licensed biologic products as comparators.
Id.
30
Id. at 1298. The FDA notes that patient-safety protection will require distinguishing among the reference product, related biological products that have not
been demonstrated to be biosimilar, biosimilar products, and interchangeable products. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DOCKET NO.
FDA-2010-N-0477, APPROVAL PATHWAY FOR BIOSIMILAR AND INTERCHANGEABLE
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS; PUBLIC HEARING; REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 64–101 (2010) [hereinafter FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. HEARING].
31
See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1296–98.
29
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products will have an impact on biotech-investor incen32
tives.
The FDA conducted a two-day public hearing in November 2010
33
to solicit comments on these and other issues. In addition to the
points noted above, the FDA panel also gathered input on the phenomenon of “drift” (i.e., post-market changes to the reference product caused by manufacturing changes) and the effect of the drift on
34
the consideration of interchangeability ratings. On the one hand,
some expressed concern as to whether the potential for drift calls into question whether products can ever be considered interchangeable, given that drift will result in both the reference product and the
biosimilar changing separately over time following biosimilar approv35
al, potentially increasing initial dissimilarities between the drugs.
On the other hand, some argued that the FDA’s process for assessing
the changes in a reference product over time, due to drift, through
comparability studies recognizes that a marketed reference product
may differ from the version of the reference product used in clinical
trials for approval, and supports the idea of weaker standards for in36
terchangeability ratings for biosimilars. One proposal for dealing
with these challenges is establishing a post-marketing system to moni37
tor interchangeability. This system could require strong pharmacovigilence and reporting standards and could potentially allow biosimilars to achieve interchangeability status after the product has been
38
observed on the market for some period of time. In particular, the
FDA requirements for evidence submitted as part of a biosimilar application will have far-reaching effects on the development of the biosimilar and innovative biotech markets. The law specifies that in reviewing biosimilar applications, the FDA will rely on the results of
analytic, animal testing, and clinical-trial data, but it is left to the
agency to determine in a particular instance precisely what studies it
39
will require. For a given biosimilar application, therefore, the FDA
could theoretically require a manufacturer to conduct, at one extreme, only a bioequivalence study (similar to what is required for
32

See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(cc), (k)(7)(C)(ii)(II) (Supp. IV 2010).
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. HEARING, supra note 30.
34
Id. at 251–70.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 41.
38
See Chad Landmon & Elizabeth Retersdorf, Challenges of FDA’s Nascent Biosimilar
Regime, LAW360 (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.law360.com/web/articles/208593.
39
BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002(k)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 805 (2010).
33
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40

generic approval under Hatch-Waxman Act ) or, at the other extreme, when science and experience do not allow it, a full program of
clinical studies equivalent to that included in a biologic licensing ap41
plication (BLA). For the foreseeable future, the FDA is likely to apply requirements that reflect the relative state of knowledge and
complexity of the molecule under review. Current FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg signaled this position when she stated,
“there will not be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. There will, rather, be
a science-driven, case-by-case decision-making process rooted in the
regulatory studies that I would encourage your [Generic Pharmaceut42
ical Association] industry to support.”
Also, the FDA will need to determine what evidence the applicant must submit to achieve a rating of interchangeability with the
43
44
reference biologic, versus a finding of biosimilarity. Achieving an
FDA finding of interchangeability may be associated with far greater
development costs than achieving a determination of biosimilarity, or
it may be limited initially to a select few examples where molecules
meet certain tests for establishing “sameness” through differentiated
45
characterization or other technology being available and validated.
For instance, the FDA’s recent approval of Sandoz’s ANDA for generic enoxaparin sodium (referencing Lovenox), although not a biosimilar (Momenta and Sandoz describe Lovenox, a chemically synthe46
sized product derived from natural sources, as a complex mixture),
may give some insight into the FDA’s current approach, and it may
also apply to more complex molecules and to findings of interchan47
geability.

40

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
42
Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at Generic
Pharm. Ass’n Annual Meeting (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm201833.htm.
43
§ 262(k)(4).
44
§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I).
45
See infra Part III.A.
46
See, e.g., Generic, MOMENTA, http://www.momentapharma.com/pipeline/
generic.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
47
See FDA Approves First Generic Enoxaparin Sodium Injection, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(July 23, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucm220092.htm; see also Letter from Keith Webber, Deputy Dir., Office of Pharm.
Sci., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, to Marcy Macdonald, Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Sandoz Int’l (July 23, 2010), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2010/077857s000ltr.pdf (approving the ANDA). The
five criteria the FDA applied in its review are summarized in Part III.
41
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The European Union has had a well-defined regulatory pathway
for biosimilars in place for several years which provides one model
48
that could inform how the FDA will elect to proceed. The European
Medicines Agency (EMA) adopted a framework that includes an
49
overarching set of principles; general guidelines on quality, safety
50
51
and efficacy; and product class-specific guidelines. To date, the
52
EMA has issued guidelines in six therapeutic classes and has approved biosimilars in three major biologic-product classes—
erythropoietins (alpha and zeta), somatropin, and granulocyte-colony
48
See Eur. Meds. Agency [EMA], Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal Products,
EMEA
Doc.
No.
CHMP/437/04
(Oct.
30,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
009/09/WC500003517.pdf.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Multidisciplinary: Biosimilar, EUR. MEDS. AGENCY, http://www.ema.europa.eu/
ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/general/general_content_000408.jsp
(last
visited Mar. 6, 2011).
52
The product-specific biosimilar guidelines include recombinant Erythropoietins, low-molecular-weight heparins, recombinant interferon alpha, Recombinant
Granulocyte-Colony Stimulating Factor, Somatropin, and Recombinant Human Insulin. See generally EMA, Guideline on Clinical and Non-Clinical Development of Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Erythropoietins (Revision), EMEA Doc.
No.
CHMP/BMWP/301636/2008
(Mar.
18.
2010),
available
at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
010/04/WC500089474.pdf; EMA, Guideline on Clinical and Non-Clinical Development of
Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing Low-Molecular-Weight Herapins, EMEA
Doc. No. CHMP/BMWP/118264/07 (Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter EMA,
EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/118264/07],
available
at
http://www.ema.europa.eu
/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2009/09/WC500003927.pdf;
EMA, Non-clinical and Clinical Development of Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Interferon Alfa, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/BMWP/102046/2006
(Apr. 23, 2009) [hereinafter EMA, EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/102046/2006], available at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
009/09/WC500003930.pdf; EMA, Annex to Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal
Products Containing Biotechnology-Derived Proteins as Active Substance: Non-Clinical and
Clinical Issues: Guidance on Similar Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Granulocyte-Colony Stimulating Factor, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/31329/2005 (Feb. 22, 2006),
available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_
guideline/2009/09/WC500003955.pdf; EMA, Annex to Guideline on Similar Biological
Medicinal Products Containing Biotechnology-Derived Proteins as Active Substance: NonClinical and Clinical Issues: Guidance on Similar Medicinal Products Containing Somatropin, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/94528/2005 (Feb. 22, 2006), available at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
009/09/WC500003956.pdf; EMA, Annex to Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal
Products Containing Biotechnology-Derived Proteins as Active Substance: Non-Clinical and
Clinical Issues: Guidance on Similar Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Human
Soluble Insulin, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/32775/05 (Feb. 22, 2006), available at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
009/09/WC500003957.pdf.
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53

stimulating factors (G-CSFs). Guidance for three other major types
of biologics are under development; the EMA has circulated a draft
54
guideline for monoclonal antibodies and concept papers for recombinant follicle stimulation hormone and recombinant interferon
55
beta. Among monoclonal antibodies are significant biologics, some
of which, such as Rituxan, face expiry of important patents in the
56
next several years. The global market for monoclonal antibodies is
estimated to have totaled $36 billion in 2009 and to exceed $60 bil57
lion in 2015. In anticipation of European and U.S. developments,
Teva Pharmaceuticals began clinical trials for its biosimilar to Rituxan, TL011, in both severe rheumatoid arthritis and CD20-positive dif58
fuse b-cell non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
The EMA has required at least one Phase II or III clinical trial
for biosimilars to demonstrate similar safety and efficacy as their reference molecules and has left questions of substitution to the mem59
ber states. If the FDA also requires significant clinical-trial evidence,
this will mean a much higher investment to obtain approvals for biosimilars as compared to generics. The cost for biosimilar approval
will depend on the number and size of the necessary clinical trials,
53
Ben Hirschler, EU Prepares for Biosimilar Antibody Drugs, REUTERS (October 1,
2010 1:05 EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/01/us-medicines-europebiosimilars-idUSTRE69047620101001. The EMA issued a draft guideline for interferon alpha and have followed this with a reflection paper (April 2009). See EMA,
EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/118264/07, supra note 52; EMA, EMEA/CHMP/BMWP/
102046/2006, supra note 52.
54
See generally EMA, Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing
Monoclonal
Antibodies
(Draft),
Nov.
18,
2010,
EMEA
Doc.
No.
CHMP/BMWP/403543/2010 (2010), available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/
docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2010/11/WC500099361.pdf
(circulated November 2010 and open for comments through May 2011).
55
EMA, Concept Paper on Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Follicle Stimulation Hormone, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/BMWP/94899/2010 (Mar.
18, 2010); EMA, Similar Biological Medicinal Products Containing Recombinant Interferon
Beta, EMEA Doc. No. CHMP/BMWP/86572/2010 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2
010/04/WC500089208.pdf.
56
See Table 3 for a list of biologics facing expiry of important patents in the next
few years. Other clinically and economically significant monoclonal antibodies include Avastin, Remicade, Herceptin, and Lucentis. See DATAMONITOR, PHARMAVITAE:
MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES: 2010, at 1 (2010).
57
DATAMONITOR, supra note 56, at 22.
58
See Naomi Kresge, Teva Targets Roche’s $5 Billion Rituxan Cancer Drug in Biosimilar Trial, BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0525/teva-targets-roche-s-5-billion-rituxan-cancer-drug-in-biosimilar-trial.html.
59
See FALK EHMANN, BIOSIMILARS—REGULATION STRATEGIES AND PATHWAY IN THE
EU (AND US) 25 (2010), available at http://www.dvfa.de/files/die_dvfa/
kommissionen/life_science/application/pdf/2_Falk_Ehmann_EMEA.pdf.
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the number of indications involved, and other specific FDA requirements. The current requirement for a BLA is typically two large-scale
60
Phase III pivotal trials. If the FDA requires at least one Phase II/III
type study comparable to those undertaken by innovators, then the
out-of-pocket costs likely will be in the range of $20 to $40 million for
61
the studies alone. In addition, the pre-clinical costs associated with
biosimilars may actually be higher for biosimilars than for innovative
products as they entail modifying the production process in order to
achieve a very specific profile that closely approximates the reference
62
product. Others have estimated that for very complex biologics,
biosimilar development costs could total $100 to $150 million and
63
take eight or more years to bring a product to market. By contrast,
the cost of completing bioequivalence studies for generic drugs is es64
timated to be only $1 to $2 million.
There are important differences between the European and U.S.
health care systems, however, that suggest biosimilar market development (and share uptake) may differ between the two regions.
Among others, the U.S. environment is more litigious than Europe,
and so the FDA may decide to proceed more cautiously and require
more clinical data than the EMA has in the past. Nevertheless, in the
United States, the FDA approved M-Enoxaparin as a fully substituta65
ble generic, which required no clinical evidence. By contrast, the
EMA would require clinical data to approve a biosimilar application
66
for a low molecular weight heparin. Costs of an FDA submission for
U.S. approval could be lower for biosimilars already on the market in
60
See Lisa M. Schwartz & Steven Woloshin, Lost in Transmission—FDA Drug Information that Never Reaches Clinicians, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1717, 1717 (2009).
61
T. Oldham, Presentation at the IBC Conference, Brussels, Belgium: Working
Out the Profit Potential for Follow-On Biologics (Mar. 1–4 2005); ELMAR SCHÄFER,
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FOBS IN EUROPE: A RISK BENEFIT ANALYSIS WITH EPO 16 (2005),
available at http://www.biogenerix.com/publications/21_Schaefer.pdf.
Schäfer
finds an upper bound of $80 million, but this estimate assumes two large-scale pivotal
trials typically required for a new molecular entity. Id.
62
See Interview with Mark McCamish, supra note 24.
63
See Ludwig Burger, Battle over Biosimilar Drugs is only for the Brave, REUTERS (July
2,
2010
11:44
AM
BST),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE
66102R20100702?rpc=401&feedType=RSS&feedName=stocksNews&rpc=401.
64
See David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics 6 (FTC
Working Paper, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/
industrydynamicsreiffenwp.pdf. Reiffen and Ward estimate that the cost of applying
for an ANDA was approximately $1.3 million in the early 1990s. Id.
65
See Letter from Keith Webber, supra note 47.
66
See Generic Enoxaparin Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatient
sandProviders/ucm220037.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
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Europe if the biosimilar can rely on previously undertaken European
clinical trials when compiling an FDA submission. The FDA, however, has not taken a position yet on whether it will accept clinical stu67
dies undertaken for approval in other jurisdictions. The ability to
rely on non-U.S. clinical studies for FDA approval of biosimilars may
be an important influence on the U.S. costs of biosimilar approval, at
least for some products. At a minimum, the FDA may require some
level of “bridging” data to justify the relevance of non-U.S. studies for
FDA approval, given that the BPCIA specifies that an applicant must
demonstrate that its product is biosimilar to a U.S.-approved refer68
ence product, and also given that biologics licensed in different re69
gions may have different characteristics.
The ongoing cost of manufacturing biological entities is also
70
significantly higher than for chemical entities. Biosimilar manufacturers would either need to construct expensive plants or obtain longterm lease or purchase agreements with third-parties that have an
FDA-approved facility if they do not already have excess suitable
71
manufacturing capacity. In any event, the cost of entry for biosimilars is likely to be an order of magnitude higher than for generic
drug products and may be closer to two orders of magnitude higher.
The high capital costs of entry together with other features discussed
below in Part IV will likely restrict the number and types of entrants,
at least initially. Further, initial entry is likely to be targeted to the
biologics with largest revenues as well as those where scientific and
market feasibility have been demonstrated in Europe.

67

Currently, the FDA is considering comments from the November 2010 public
hearing on “to what extent, if any, should animal or clinical data comparing a proposed biosimilar product with a non-U.S.-licensed comparator product be used to
support a demonstration of biosimilarity to a U.S.-licensed reference product.” Approval Pathway for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biological Products; Public Hearing; Request for Comments, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,497, 61,499 (Oct. 5, 2010).
68
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(4) (Supp. IV 2010). Reference product “means the single
biological product licensed under subsection (a) against which a biological product
is evaluated in an application submitted under subsection (k).”
Id.; §
262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I).
69
The FDA’s inquiry into the use of bridging data, see supra note 67, to justify the
use of non-U.S. approved reference products may reflect concerns that non-U.S. approved reference products could possess different characteristics than the U.S. approved counterpart.
70
A Brief Primer on Manufacturing Therapeutic Proteins, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS.
ORG., http://www.bio.org/healthcare/pmp/factsheet1.asp (last visited Mar. 6,
2011).
71
Id.
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III. INTERCHANGEABILITY AND DEMAND SIDE ECONOMIC FACTORS
A. Regulatory Requirements for Interchangeability
Another key regulatory issue will be the analytical and clinical
evidence necessary for the FDA to deem a biosimilar interchangeable
with its reference product, thus enabling automatic substitution without physician approval, subject to relevant state laws. For a biosimilar
to be interchangeable, an applicant must demonstrate that the product is biosimilar to the U.S. reference product and that it “can be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product in
72
any given patient.” Taken to the extreme, no product could demonstrate the same result in literally every patient, so the FDA’s guidance on how to interpret this requirement will be an important, and
likely contentious, factor. For products used more than once by patients (the majority of biologic products), this will require a demonstration that switching between the biosimilar and reference product
poses no additional risk of reduced safety or efficacy beyond that
73
posed by the reference product alone. This will likely require crossover trial designs in which patients in clinical trials switch between
the products over time. It can be difficult to recruit patients for these
trials and potentially expensive to perform at a scale necessary to obtain statistical significance. It is also unclear what factors the FDA will
consider in evaluating the potential risks related to alternating or
switching between the biosimilar(s) and the reference product.
Many firms may elect not to make the investments necessary to pursue interchangeability initially, given the current state of uncertainty
and scientific knowledge regarding biosimilars. This is in contrast to
generics, where an “A” rating by the FDA recognizes the products as
therapeutically equivalent and eligible for substitution by pharmacists
without physician approval, subject to state substitution laws, thus
74
driving rapid share loss by the branded reference product.
While there have not yet been any approvals under a new biosimilar pathway in the United States, the FDA has approved two more
complex molecules that share some characteristics with biologics,
enoxaparin sodium and somatropin, by relying in part on a reference
75
product’s safety and efficacy data. These approvals may shed light
72

BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002(k)(4)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. 119, 806 (2010).
§ 7002(a).
74
See THOMAS BROWN, HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL PHARMACY PRACTICE 482 (4th
ed. 2006).
75
The FDA approved Momenta’s enoxaparin sodium as a generic version of Sanofi-Aventis’s Lovenox through the ANDA pathway, see supra note 47, and approved
73
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on how the FDA will review biosimilars and evaluate interchangeability. The recent FDA approval of Sandoz’s and Momenta’s enoxaparin
sodium ANDA and its comments associated with that approval suggest that the FDA will evaluate biosimilarity and interchangeability on
a case-by-case basis, dependent on the state of scientific knowledge in
76
each class of medicines. In the case of relatively less complex and
better-characterized biologics, some biosimilar manufacturers may
elect to pursue an interchangeability rating.
Enoxaparin is a chemically-synthesized product, derived from
77
naturally-sourced porcine [or pig] heparin. In summarizing its rea78
soning in assigning an AP rating of interchangeability with respect
to the reference product Lovenox and Sandoz and Momenta’s enoxaparin sodium, the FDA cited five criteria, some of which are unique
to enoxaparin and thus would not apply to recombinant DNA bio79
technology products: (1) equivalence of heparin source material
and mode of depolymerization, (2) equivalence of physiochemical
properties, (3) equivalence of the elements that constitute the enoxaparin molecule (i.e., the disaccharide building blocks, fragment
mapping, and sequence of oligosaccharide species), (4) equivalence
in biological and biochemical assays, and (5) equivalence of in vivo
80
pharmacodynamic profile. The first three criteria ensure that the
heparin source material, the chemical reaction used in the production process, and the structure of the active ingredient are equivalent
to that of the reference product; the fourth and fifth criteria ensure
that the biosimilar has the same degree of therapeutic activity as the
reference product. Based on these five criteria, the FDA found the
products to be interchangeable and did not require any clinical stu-

Novartis’s growth hormone Omnitrope through the § 505(b)(2) pathway. See Letter
from Robert Meyer, Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation II, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation &
Research, to Beth Brannan, Sandoz Int’l (May 30, 2006), available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2006/021426s000LTR.p
df (approving the § 505(b)(2) application).
76
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
77
Establishing Active Ingredient Sameness for a Generic Enoxaparin Sodium, a Low Molecular Weight Heparin, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm220023.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Generic Enoxaparin Sodium].
78
For an explanation on FDA ratings, see Orange Book Preface, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
79
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Generic Enoxaparin Sodium, supra note 77.
80
Id.
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81

dies. This is in contrast to the situation in Europe, where the EMA
guideline adopts a biosimilar approach to low-molecular-weight heparins, such as Lovenox, and requires clinical studies for approval but
82
does not consider interchangeability with Lovenox.
Prior to the M-Enoxaparin approval decision, in June 2006, the
FDA approved Novartis’s growth hormone, Omnitrope, as a follow-on
83
protein to Pfizer’s Genotropin. Because some older biologics such
as human recombinant insulin and growth hormone were approved
as new drugs through the New Drug Application (NDA) process under the FD&C Act, the § 505(b)2 pathway under that Act allows the
FDA to rely on published scientific literature or its previous findings
84
for similar products as the basis for approval. The FDA narrowly limited Omnitrope’s approval as applying to protein products approved as NDAs, which also had a single active ingredient, a wellunderstood mechanism of action, and could be well-characterized by
85
existing technology. While Omnitrope met all these criteria, the
FDA did not find sufficient data to rate the product therapeutically
equivalent or interchangeable with Genotropin or other approved
86
human growth hormones.
The approval of M-Enoxaparin and Omnitrope may have limited
lessons for, and applicability to, the expected FDA requirements for
biosimilar approval for more complex biologics with expiring patents
in the near future, including the G-CSFs, erythropoietin, and interfe-

81
Generic Enoxaparin Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatient
sandProviders/ucm220037.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
82
Id.
83
See Letter from Robert Meyer, supra note 75.
84
Follow-on Protein Products: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Janet Woodcock, Deputy Comm’r, Chief
Med. Officer, FDA), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/
ucm154070.htm.
85
Omnitrope (somatropin [rDNA origin]) Questions and Answers, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (accessed through Wayback Machine), http://replay.waybackmachine.org/
20090513141602/http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/somatropin/qa.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Omnitrope Q&A]; see also
Letter from Steven Galson, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., to Kathleen Sanzo, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Stephan Lawton, Biotechnology Indus. Org., and Stephen Juelsgaard, Genentech 7–8 (May 30, 2006),.
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04P0231/04P-0231pdn0001.pdf (denying various Citizen Petitions that opposed approval of Omnitrope).
86
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 85.
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87

ron beta. For the foreseeable future, applications for biosimilars in
these classes of more complex biologics are likely to require some
clinical-trial data for approval and, even more complicated, costly
clinical trials to satisfy the law’s requirements to be approved as an interchangeable product. The scope and extent of evidence necessary
to demonstrate similarity is likely to evolve over time in accordance
with Commissioner Hamburg’s statement of a case-by-case regulatory
process, which reflects ongoing scientific and technological develop88
ments.
B. Patient and Physician Perspectives
The rate of biosimilar penetration is expected to vary by disease
indication, patient type, physician specialty, and other factors. As
noted, rates of patient and physician acceptance of biosimilars are
expected to be lower when the biosimilar lacks an interchangeability
rating. In addition, rates of biosimilar acceptance may vary according
to such physician and patient-focused factors as: whether the physician specialty is historically more price-sensitive or exhibits greater levels of brand loyalty in therapy choice (e.g., primary care physicians
versus specialists, allergists versus rheumatologists); whether the biosimilars will be used over long periods of time as maintenance therapy or only once or twice during a narrow clinical window of treatment
opportunity (particularly if long-term clinical data is not available);
whether the indication is life-threatening or the implications of therapeutic non-response or adverse reactions are perceived to be very
serious; or whether the difference in ease-of-use or out-of-pocket cost
to the patient of the brand instead of the biosimilar is expected to be
89
high.
When patients are stable on a given maintenance therapy, biosimilar substitution may tend to be concentrated among new patient
starts. As a result, the penetration of biosimilars for indications with a
87

As noted earlier, following both the FDA approval of M-Enoxaparin and Omnitrope, the FDA specified that those approvals did not necessarily set precedents for
future approvals of other biologic therapies. It is therefore, the authors’ opinion
that the approvals of M-Enoxaparin and Omnitrope may provide limited guidance
on potential FDA requirements for biosimilar approval of more complex biologics
where less may be known about the structure of the molecule and the mechanism of
action.
88
See Hamburg, supra note 42.
89
See generally Henry Grabowski et al., The Effect on Federal Spending of Legislation Creating a Regulatory Framework for Follow-on Biologics: Key Issues and Assumptions (Aug. 2007) (unpublished White Paper, Duke Univ. Dep’t of Econ.),
available at
http://econ.duke.edu/Papers/PDF/0907_H_Grabowski_I_Cockburn
_G_Long_et_al_Effect_on_Federal_Spending_of_Follow_on_Biologics.pdf.
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low rate of turnover in the patient populations may be more limited if
products are not interchangeable. The degree of biosimilar uptake
will also depend on cost differences and incentives to utilize biosimilars employed by managed care and government payers, as discussed
90
below. These financial incentives, however, are likely to be tempered if existing patients are responding well to an established therapy. This factor, together with additional factors—specialists’ brand
loyalty, clinically-vulnerable patient populations, and physician conservatism in switching stable patients to new therapies—are likely to
constrain rates of biosimilar uptake for existing patients below levels
91
observed for new patients.
Another important demand-side factor is the perspective of specialist physicians and patient groups concerning biosimilars. Physicians who have years of experience with the reference biologic may
be reluctant to substitute a biosimilar even for new patients until sufficient experience has accumulated in clinical practice settings, as
opposed to clinical trials, provided there is patient access to the ref92
erence product. In order to stimulate demand, it may be necessary
for biosimilar firms to establish “reputation bonds” with physicians
through strategies similar to those employed by branded firms that
communicate information to establish brand value through physician
93
detailing, publications, advertising, and education programs. In addition, patient assistance programs and contracts with health plans,
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), hospitals, or provider groups,
which will exercise control over therapy choice, may be used in a targeted way to strengthen the economic proposition associated with
biosimilar adoption. These tactics will increase the cost of drug distribution and marketing for biosimilars compared to generics where
such marketing and sales costs are minimal and demand is purely
driven by lower price and pharmacy contracts for availability.
C. Reimbursement and Payer Considerations
Even if biosimilars are viewed as therapeutic alternatives rather
than equivalents, hospital or insurer pharmacy and therapeutic
(P&T) committees may determine that they are similar enough to institute various incentives to encourage biosimilar utilization, at least
for new patients. This cost sensitivity may vary across different payer
groups, including private insurers, Medicaid, and Medicare.
90
91
92
93

See infra Part III.C.
See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 36.
See id. at 36–37.
See id. at 36.
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Private Insurers

Historically, managed care plans have been reluctant to restrict
94
access or pursue aggressive cost-control measures because many biologic therapies are targeted to cancer and other diseases that are
life-threatening or involve serious disability, and have often been
without close substitutes. In addition, biologics are often managed
within plans as medical benefits rather than pharmacy benefits, and
are typically less subject to centralized controls or formulary restric95
tions. This has been changing over the last several years, particularly in indications where there is a choice between multiple brandname biologics. The introduction of biosimilars can be expected to
accelerate these trends toward more active management of biologic
choice, costs, and utilization.
The relatively high price of biologic treatments, and their growing utilization, indicates that payers have substantial incentives to actively manage access to these therapies and implement access restrictions and incentives that encourage the use of lower-priced biologics
and biosimilars. Over the past decade, even with respect to noninterchangeable branded biologics, public and private health insurance plans have begun to develop and put into place medical management, network design, and benefit design strategies to control
access to, and utilization of, biologic therapies. Prior authorization
or step-edit requirements and formulary tiering with preferred products are used by commercial health insurance plans to manage spe96
cialty pharmaceuticals. The use of specialty tiers—in which patient
financial contribution is in the form of coinsurance rather than copayment—has also been growing and the introduction of lowerpriced biosimilars may further accelerate a trend towards multiple
97
specialty tiers and preferred specialty therapies.

94

See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1295.
See id.
96
See Debbie Stern & Debi Reissman, Specialty Pharmacy Cost Management Strategies
of Private Health Care Payers, 12 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 736, 741 (2006) (citing
HEALTH STRATEGY GRP., MCO TRENDS IN SPECIALTY PHARMACY MANAGEMENT (2004)),
available at http://www.amcp.org/data/jmcp/736-744.pdf). See generally C. Daniel
Mullins et al., Health Plan’s Strategies for Managing Outpatient Specialty Pharmaceuticals,
25 HEALTH AFFS. 1332 (2006).
97
See Stern & Reissman, supra note 96, at 740–41.
95
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2.

Medicare

Medicare reimburses biologics under either the Part B or the
98
Part D program, depending largely on the mode of administration.
Many biologic drugs are currently dispensed in a physician’s office,
99
clinic, or hospital as infused agents. The use of these biologics for
Medicare patients is covered under the Medicare Part B program,
while self-injectable biologics dispensed in pharmacies (including by
specialty pharmacy or mail-order programs) are covered by the Part
100
D program.
i.

Medicare Part B

In designing the new abbreviated pathway for biosimilars, Congress was concerned that the current Medicare rules for reimbursement of drugs administered under Part B would provide inadequate
101
financial incentives for providers to utilize lower-priced biosimilars.
Part B drugs are often purchased through a “buy and bill” approach
by providers who also make decisions about which therapies are ap102
propriate for a given patient. The provider is reimbursed by Medicare for administering a Part B drug, and the level of reimbursement
is based on the weighted average selling price (ASP) for the category
103
to which the drug belongs (the “J-code”), plus six percent.
When
generics are assigned to the same J-code as their reference new chemical entity, the physician receives the same level of reimbursement,
the volume-weighted average ASP for all manufacturers’ products,
regardless of whether he or she uses the generic or the reference
104
product. This may provide a strong incentive for physicians to util98
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
YOUR MEDICARE BENEFITS 21 (2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/
Publications/Pubs/pdf/10116.pdf.
99
Id.
100
Medicare Part B (Medical Insurance), MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/
navigation/medicare-basics/medicare-benefits/part-b.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2011);
Medicare Part D (Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage), MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-basics/medicare-benefits/partd.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
101
See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING
INCENTIVES IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 124–29 (2009).
102
See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., COMPETITIVE ACQUISITION PROGRAM (CAP) FOR PART B DRUGS (2005),
available at https://www.cms.gov/transmittals/downloads/R777CP.pdf.
103
BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3139, 124 Stat. 119, 439 (2010).
104
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 101, at 118–19; see also CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, PUB NO. 4043, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON MEDICARE’S
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING (2010).
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ize the lower-cost generic product, depending on the net-acquisition
cost of both products to the physician, reflecting any contracts that
may be in place with the brand manufacturer and the pricing strategy
105
of the generic entrant. Biosimilars may not be deemed interchangeable by the FDA, however, and therefore would not be assigned to
106
the same J-code as the brand product. Legislators were concerned
that in such instances reimbursement incentives would encourage
utilizing the more expensive (higher ASP) reference product for pa107
tients, as reimbursement is based on ASP plus six percent.
To mitigate potential financial disincentives for physicians to
adopt biosimilars, the new legislation sets biosimilar reimbursement
under Medicare Part B at the sum of the biosimilar’s ASP and six
108
percent of the ASP of the reference biologic product.
The reference biologic product will continue to be reimbursed at its own ASP
109
plus six percent. By basing the six percent payment to providers on
the reference brand’s ASP, the legislation seeks to mitigate provider
disincentives to adopt lower cost biosimilars when they are not
110
deemed to be interchangeable and are placed in separate J-codes.
Whether this reimbursement provision will be sufficient to overcome
physician experience and loyalty to the reference biologic, as well as
other financial incentives, is an open question. Stronger financial incentives had been proposed by some, including two forms of reference pricing that have had only limited use in the Medicare program,
least costly alternative (LCA) requirements and functional equiva111
lents.
A recent case involving Part B inhalation drugs constrained
the authority of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
and its regional carriers to apply LCA requirements without statutory
105

MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 101, at 107.
Id. at 107–08.
107
Id. at 115–16. An individual provider’s incentives will depend upon the relative net-acquisition cost of the brand and biosimilar versions of the product. Brand
manufacturers selectively lower the acquisition costs for providers through contracting, depending upon volume or other criteria, which in turn affects ASP. Id. at 130
n.13.
108
BPCIA § 3139.
109
Id.
110
Others have raised concerns over shared J-codes due to “track and trace” public health requirements. See, e.g., The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109171, § 6002, 120 Stat. 4, 59 (2005) (requiring physicians to include the National Drug
Code (NDC) in addition to the J-code on Medicaid reimbursement forms). Without
the NDC code, Medicaid is unable to identify the corresponding manufacturer on
shared J-code claims and therefore, is unable to request Medicaid rebates from the
manufacturer.
111
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 101, at 124–29.
106
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changes, concluding that the statutory direction to CMS reimburse112
ment using ASP precluded its using LCA policies.
A functional
equivalent approach had been used by CMS in its 2003 hospital outpatient payment rule, reimbursing both darbepoetin alfa and epoetin
alfa at the same rate, based on a finding that “the two products are
113
functionally equivalent” and “produce the same clinical result.”
Later, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) limited the application of the functional
equivalent standard and prohibited its use for other drugs and bi114
ologics in determining hospital outpatient payments.
While biosimilar reimbursement methodology is specified under the new statute,
coverage decisions by regional carriers may vary and also could prove
to be important, as suggested by the LCA example.
ii.

Medicare Part D

Privately offered Medicare Part D drug programs cover retail
115
drugs including self-injectable biologics.
Biologics accounted for
only six percent of total prescription drug costs in the Medicare Part
116
D program in 2007; however, spending for biologics within the Part
D program is expected to increase rapidly over the coming years. Between 2006 and 2007, biologic prescription drug costs within the Part
D program grew by thirty-six percent, exceeding the overall Part D
117
expenditure growth of twenty-two percent.
Expenditures for selfinjected biologics are expected to continue to grow rapidly in the future, as they are increasingly used to treat a wide range of diseases,
such as rheumatoid arthritis, and given the large number of new biologics currently under development. The high price of self-injected
biologics relative to traditional new chemical entities (NCEs) also
suggests that biologics will comprise an increasing share of Part D expenditures in the future. This may lead payers to pursue pharmacy

112

See, e.g., Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Changes to the Hospital Outpatient PPS and Calendar Year 2003 Payment
Rates, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,718, 66,758, (Nov. 1, 2002) (to be codified at CFR 42 pts. 405,
419).
114
See Patricia Seliger Keenan et al., Biotechnology and Medicare’s New Technology Policy: Lessons from Three Case Studies, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 1260, 1262 (2006), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/5/1260.
115
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 101, at 120; Medicare Part D
(Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage), supra note 100.
116
JOAN SOKOLOVSKY & HANNAH MILLER, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N,
MEDICARE PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 8 (2009), available at
http://www.medpac.gov/transcripts/followon%20biologics.pdf.
117
Id.
113
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management techniques aimed at controlling utilization of these bi118
ologics.
Many Medicare Part D plan designs include a specialty-drug tier,
with average coinsurance rates increasing from twenty-five percent in
119
2006 to thirty-three percent in 2009.
Coinsurance plan designs
could produce strong incentives to utilize biosimilars if substantial
discounts emerge for biologic products with expensive courses of
120
treatment for patients.
Preferred specialty drugs might be subject
to lower rates of coinsurance, to a copayment rather than to coinsurance, or to lower patient out-of-pocket costs at the same coinsurance
rate.
One limiting factor to formulary incentives for biologics in Medicare Part D is that enrollees with low-income subsidies make up a
disproportionately large share of the market for biologics under the
121
Part D program. Given that these individuals are subject to limited
cost sharing, other instruments such as step therapy and prior autho122
rization may be employed to incentivize the use of biosimilars.
Finally, there is uncertainty as to whether biosimilars will be
treated as brands or generics for purposes of mandated manufacturer
pricing, and therefore patient costs, during the transition period under the federal health care reform law to eliminate the coverage gap
123
or “donut hole” in the Part D program.
Starting in 2011, brand
products are required to be sold at a 50% price discount to enrollees
124
when their spending is in the coverage gap. Generic products are
125
Plan cost-sharing requirements
subject to no such requirement.
over the 2011 to 2020 period also differ between brand and generic
products. It is currently unclear how CMS will treat biosimilars with
respect to spending in the coverage gap, and whether they will face
the same price discount and cost-sharing requirements as branded
118

See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1294–95.
2009 plan designs were applied to 2008 plan enrollments for calculations. See
ELIZABETH HARGRAVE ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE PART D 2008 DATA
SPOTLIGHT: SPECIALTY TIERS (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/
upload/7711.pdf; JACK HOADLEY ET AL., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N,
MEDICARE PART D BENEFIT DESIGNS AND FORMULARIES, 2006–2009 (2008), available at
http://www.medpac.gov/transcripts/MedPAC%20Formulary%20Presentation%20%20Hoadley%2012-05-08%20revised.pdf.
120
HARGRAVE ET AL., supra note 119.
121
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 104, at 4 fig.1 (2010).
122
Id. at 6.
123
Id. at 21.
124
Id. at 3.
125
Id.; see id. at tbl.1.
119
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drugs, or if they will be treated similarly to generics in this respect
126
and face no price discount requirements. If CMS were to categorize biosimilar drugs with generics for this purpose, there could be
circumstances during the transition years in which it is economically
attractive for patients and plans to utilize the reference brand over
biosimilars, taking into account the “donut hole” discounts by brands
relative to biosimilar discounts, the cost-sharing requirements for
127
brands and generics, and related economic factors.
CMS has not
announced how biosimilars will be categorized for the purpose of the
Part D “donut hole” discounting requirement.
3.

Medicaid

Medicaid Preferred Drug Lists (PDLs) reflect preferred biologic
products in a number of therapeutic categories. Preferred drugs typically can be dispensed without undergoing access controls such as
prior authorization which are applied to non-preferred drugs. For
example, on-line PDLs for Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas, indicate that current rheumatoid arthritis (RA), hepatitis C (HCV), and human growth hormone formularies in these
six large states preferred two or three RA agents (of six), one or two
HCV agents (of five), and between two and five human growth hor128
mones (of nine agents/forms).
Medicaid programs can be expected to encourage biosimilars through PDLs and other medical
management instruments. States with managed Medicaid programs
apply formulary and access management techniques common in
129
commercial insurance plans.

126

Id. at 20–21.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 104, at 20–21.
128
See FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., FLORIDA MEDICAID PREFERRED DRUG
LIST
(2011),
available
at
http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/
Prescribed_Drug/pharm_thera/pdf/pdl.pdf; ILL. MEDICAID, PREFERRED DRUG LIST
(2011), available at http://www.hfs.illinois.gov/assets/pdl.pdf; OHIO MEDICAID,
PREFERRED
DRUG
LIST
(2010),
available
at
http://jfs.ohio.gov/
ohp/bhpp/PDLQuicklist.pdf; PA. MEDICAID, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FEE-FOR-SERVICE
PREFERRED DRUG LIST (2010), available at http://www.providersynergies.com/
services/documents/PAM_PDL_20110215.pdf; TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TEXAS
MEDICAID PREFERRED DRUG LIST (2011), available at http://www.txvendordrug.com/
downloads/pdl/TXPDL_012011.pdf; NYS Medicaid Pharmacy Prior Authorization ProMAGELLAN
MEDICAID
ADMIN.,
https://newyork.fhsc.com/
grams,
enrollees/PDP_about.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
129
ROBERT NAVARRO, MANAGED CARE PHARMACY PRACTICE 77 (2d ed. 2009).
127
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Hospitals

Hospitals typically bear the costs of biologics used during inpatient hospital stays as part of a fixed global reimbursement payment scheme that includes other services and products. Consequently, these hospitals have incentives to implement access restrictions
and other mechanisms that encourage the use of lower-priced biolog130
ics and biosimilars. As a result, for biologics that are generally used
in hospital settings, hospitals will play a larger role than insurance
companies in affecting the demand for biosimilar therapies. In the
hospital sector, P&T committees review the drugs that are stocked, on
standing order forms, and which can be used by physicians. Hospitals
also rely on Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) to gain leverage
in negotiating discounts from suppliers, including biologic manufac131
turers.
Because the hospital GPO market is highly concentrated,
favorable contracts with a handful of suppliers can have an important
effect on product selection. In addition, fixed diagnosis-related
group-based reimbursement creates strong incentives for input-cost
132
reductions where possible. To the degree that biologics used in the
inpatient hospital setting are included in diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs), depending on how significant a portion of spending they
represent, hospitals may be aggressive in implementing financial incentives and access controls to favor the utilization of some biosimilars if biosimilar prices are not countered by the brand name manufacturers.

130
See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, CHAPTER 17: DRUGS AND
BIOLOGICS (2010) (outlining the incentive structure for biologics), available at
https://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/clm104c17.pdf.
131
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REVIEW OF REVENUE FROM VENDORS AT THREE GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS AND
THEIR
MEMBERS
(2005),
available
at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/
region5/50300074.pdf.
132
DRGs are used to classify the type of treatment that a patient receives while
admitted at a hospital for inpatient care. The specific DRG assigned to a case is determined based on diagnoses, procedures, discharge status, and patient characteristics for that episode of care. For most cases, Medicare reimburses hospitals a fixed
amount for an inpatient episode of care based on the assigned DRG irrespective of
the actual costs incurred by the hospital for that specific patient. See e.g., U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL INPATIENT PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
SYSTEM (2010) (fact sheet regarding Medicare payments to facilities providing acute
hospital inpatient care), available at http://www.cms.gov/MLNProducts/
downloads/AcutePaymtSysfctsht.pdf.
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5.

Health Care Reform Initiatives

More widespread adoption of comparative- and cost-effectiveness
analyses across the U.S. health care system could further influence
adoption of biologics in the future. Formal cost-effectiveness reviews
by payers have been well-established in geographies outside the Unit133
ed States in the form of Health Technology Assessments (HTAs).
In the United Kingdom, for example, the National Institute of Health
and Clinical Excellence’s (NICE) coverage recommendations have
been based on strict reviews of cost-effectiveness calculations relative
to an implied standard of an acceptable cost per quality-adjusted life
134
year (QALY). The creation of the new Patient-Centered Outcomes
Research Institute (PCORI) as part of the recently enacted U.S.
health reform legislation may contribute to further increases in cost135
and comparative-effectiveness pressures.
Finally, longer-term changes in reimbursement policies may further shift financial incentives toward the use of biosimilars. For example, the adoption of global-payment strategies, rather than fee-forservice reimbursement, or some form of shared savings, could strengthen the link between physician and/or hospital compensation and
use of lower-priced biologics. Global payment strategies provide incentives for the adoption of lower-cost treatments (and potentially
encourage greater price competition) by setting a fixed-payment level
for a patient/episode of care, with all, or a portion of, cost savings ac136
cruing to the care providers. Several states are considering implementing global-payment strategies, and it has been suggested that
government programs such as Medicaid could be the first to imple137
ment these strategies.

133

See, e.g., Measuring Effectiveness and Cost Effectiveness: The QALY, NAT’L INST. OF
HEALTH & CLINICAL EXCELLENCE (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.nice.org.uk/
newsroom/features/measuringeffectivenessandcosteffectivenesstheqaly.jsp.
134
See id.
135
BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 262 (Supp. IV 2010)).
136
See HOSPITAL ACUTE INPATIENT SERVICES PAYMENT SYSTEM, MEDPAC 1 (2010),
available
at
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_10
_hospital.pdf.
137
See, e.g., Liz Kowalczyk, Massachusetts Recasting Health Payments: Officials Draft
Plans for New System to Compensate Doctors, Hospitals, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 2010, at
Metro 1.
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IV. BIOSIMILAR COMPETITION VERSUS GENERIC COMPETITION
A. Generic Competition
Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act twenty-five years
ago, generic competition has become the main instrument of price
138
competition in the U.S. pharmaceutical market. Generic products
139
in 2009 accounted for three-quarters of all U.S. prescriptions, com140
pared to only nineteen percent in 1984. The growth of generic utilization has been accelerated by various formulary and utilization
management techniques such as tiered formularies, prior authorization and step edits, higher reimbursements to pharmacies for dis141
pensing generics, and maximum allowable cost (MAC) programs.
A distinctive pattern of generic competition has been observed
142
in various economic studies. There is a strong positive relationship
both between a product’s market sales and the likelihood of a patent
challenge, and between the number of generic entrants and the intensity of generic price competition once the exclusivity period has
143
expired. An increasing number of products are now subject to patent challenges earlier in their product life cycle, as generic firms
seek out the 180-day exclusivity period awarded to the first firm to file
144
an ANDA with a successful Paragraph IV challenge.
Significant
products typically experience multiple entrants within the first several
months after patent expiration, and generic price levels drop toward
145
marginal costs rapidly as generic entry increases.

138

See Henry Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 439, 447 (2007).
139
Gary Gatyas, IMS Health Reports U.S. Prescription Sales Grew 5.1 Percent in 2009, to
$300.3 Billion, IMS HEALTH (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.imshealth.com/portal/
site/imshealth/menuitem.a46c6d4df3db4b3d88f611019418c22a/?vgnextoid=d690a2
7e9d5b7210VgnVCM100000ed152ca2RCRD.
140
FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY I (2002).
141
See generally Murray Aitken et al., Prescription Drug Spending Trends in the United
States: Looking Beyond the Turning Point 28 HEALTH AFFS. w151 (2009) (discussing recent trends in drug spending and the importance of biosimilars in the market).
142
Henry Grabowski, Competition Between Generic and Branded Drugs, in
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 153–73 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruye Hsieh eds.,
2007).
143
Id. at 158.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 158, 161.
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B. Theoretical Models of Biosimilar Competition
Given the much higher costs of entry for biosimilars compared
to generic drugs, as well as the other demand- and supply-side factors
discussed above, the pattern of biosimilar competition is expected to
146
differ from current generic competition.
In particular, fewer entrants and less intensive price discounting are expected and competition may resemble branded competition more than generic competition. This is currently the case in the human growth hormone
market, where there are eight products that compete both through
price and product delivery differentiation, such as more convenient
147
pen dispensers.
In 2006, Sandoz entered the market with Omnitrope but has struggled to gain market share. Initially, Omnitrope
was priced at a thirty-percent discount based on wholesale acquisition
cost (WAC) compared to the most widely used biologic in this class,
148
Genetropin. By 2008, Omnitrope’s discount had increased to forty
149
percent. Despite these discounts, Omnitrope’s share of somatropin
150
use remained below two percent. These outcomes may not be reflective of the substitution potential for biosimilars generally, given
that the human growth hormone market is a mature one with a
number of competitors, in which an important factor in a product’s
151
success is its delivery system.
Many of the established brands have
invested in more sophisticated pen- or needle-free delivery systems
compared to the delivery systems used by recent lower-priced entrants.
To date, some theoretical analyses have attempted to model the
likely scenarios for biosimilar competition in the U.S. market. Henry
Grabowski, David Ridley, and Kevin Schulman focus on how the
higher costs of biosimilar entry will influence the number of entrants
152
and the expected discounts.
Using a simulation approach, they
project a relatively small number of entrants even for larger-selling
biologic products, and more modest discounts on biosimilars, than in
the case of generics. Devin Chauhan, Adrian Towse, and Jorge Me-

146

See Grabowski et al., supra note 23, at 1292–1300.
See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 45.
148
Paul Heldman, Potomac Research Grp., Presentation to the Federal Trade
Commission: Follow-on Biologic Market: Initial Lessons and Challenges Ahead (Nov.
21, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hcbio/docs/fob/
pheldman.pdf.
149
See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 45.
150
See Heldman, supra note 148.
151
See generally Grabowski et al., supra note 89.
152
See generally Grabowski et al., supra note 138.
147
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stre-Ferrandiz propose a segmented model of biosimilar competition,
in which they expect biosimilars to be utilized significantly in the
price-sensitive portion of the market but less so in the non-pricesensitive portion of the market (given the reluctance of many providers to utilize biosimilars until considerable clinical experience has ac153
cumulated).
Average price discounts will depend on the relative
size of these market segments. The authors expect that, given a relatively small number of branded biosimilar competitors, the innovator
will discount prices from pre-entry levels but not to the same level as
the biosimilar entrants. This is in contrast to generic competition
where branded firms typically do not lower prices post-entry but may
license an authorized generic when only a small number of generic
competitors are expected as a result of a successful paragraph IV en154
try with a 180-day exclusivity award.
C. Empirical Studies of Generic Drug Analogues
Other researchers have attempted to predict how biosimilar
competition will emerge by considering analogous situations, including the U.S. generic market for certain products which share some
characteristics suggestive of biologics. Grabowski et al. divided small
molecule drugs into two classes, non-complex and complex, with
complex drugs being those that meet two of the following criteria:
black box warnings, narrow therapeutic index, prescribed by specialists, oncology products, or manufacturing technology that is available
155
to only a limited number of firms.
They analyzed price and quantity data from IMS Health Inc. for
thirty-five conventional (i.e., non-biologic) drugs that experienced
generic entry between 1997 and 2003 and found that complex drugs
are associated with lower levels of generic share and price dis156
counts. Figure 1 compares the average generic share over time for
drugs with two or more of the above complex characteristics to drugs
157
with one or none of these characteristics. One year after initial generic entry, the mean generic share for drugs with two or more complex characteristics was forty-five percent, while drugs with one or no

153
DEVEN CHAUHAN ET AL., THE MARKET FOR BIOSIMILARS: EVOLUTION AND POLICY
OPTIONS, 45 OFFICE OF HEALTH & ECON. BRIEFING 12–14 (2008).
154
Ernst R. Berndt et al., Authorized Generic Drugs, Price Competition, and Consumers’
Welfare, 26 HEALTH AFFS. 790, 792–97 (2007).
155
See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 42.
156
Id.
157
Id.
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complex characteristics had a mean generic share of seventy-eight
158
percent (1.7 times higher).
159

FIGURE 1
Average Generic Share of the Molecule by Complex Drug Characteristics
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100%

80%

60%

40%
Drugs with 2 or more
Complex Characteristics
20%
Drugs with 1 or no
Complex Characteristics
0%
0

3

6

9

12

15

18

21

24

Months After Patent Expiry

Figure 2 compares the generic price discounts from the brand
over time for drugs with two or more of the above complex characte160
ristics to drugs with one or none of these characteristics. One year
after initial generic entry, the generic price discount for drugs with
two or more complex characteristics was thirty-five percent, while
drugs with one or no complex characteristics had a generic discount
of fifty-eight percent (1.6 times higher). The lower mean levels of
generic shares and price discounts for drugs with two or more complex characteristics are also reflected in a lower number of generic
entrants. On average, drugs with two or more characteristics faced
2.5 generic entrants one year following initial generic entry, while
158

Id. at 42–43.
Figure 1 represents the authors’ calculations from a sample of 35 drugs experiencing generic entry between 1997 and 2003. The pharmaceutical sales data come
from IMS National Sales Perspectives Data. A description of the data source is available at, IMS HEALTH, http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth/menuitem.
a46c6d4df3db4b3d88f611019418c22a/?vgnextoid=1cb0eec5accb2210VgnVCM10000
0ed152ca2RCRD&cpsextcurrchannel=1 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). The determination of complex characteristics for each drug is based on the authors’ research.
160
Id. at 43, 53 fig.2.
159
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Generic Price Discount from Brand Price (%)

drugs with one or no characteristics faced an average of 8.5 generic
entrants.
161
FIGURE 2
Average Generic Price Discount from Brand Price for the Molecule
by Complex Drug Characteristics
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While the data from conventional generics should not be directly applied to estimate biosimilar shares following market entry in the
biologics market, they suggest that biosimilar uptake will be signifi162
cantly lower than is observed today in the case of generic drugs.
Even these more complex generic drugs are nevertheless rated therapeutically equivalent (i.e., have an FDA rating of A) and, therefore,
163
benefit from some automatic substitution. In order to avoid substitution, physicians need to specify in “do not substitute” orders that
164
prescriptions are to be dispensed as written. At least initially, most
biosimilars will not likely be rated therapeutically equivalent and,

161

Figure 2 represents the authors’ calculations from a sample of 35 drugs experiencing generic entry between 1997 and 2003. The pharmaceutical sales data come
from IMS National Sales Perspectives Data. A description of the data source is available at, IMS HEALTH, http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth/menuitem.
a46c6d4df3db4b3d88f611019418c22a/?vgnextoid=1cb0eec5accb2210VgnVCM10000
0ed152ca2RCRD&cpsextcurrchannel=1 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). The determination of complex characteristics for each drug is based on the authors’ research.
162
Id. at 43.
163
Id.
164
See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 43.
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165

therefore, will not be subject to automatic substitution. The recent
FDA approval of generic enoxaparin, rated as therapeutically equivalent to branded Lovenox (which has an AP rating), will provide important data about competitive pricing strategy and market acceptance of a complex, “biologic-like” product in which only a few
competitors are anticipated, based on the technical similarity and
166
manufacturing requirements involved. Currently, the FDA has ap167
proved only a single manufacturer’s ANDA, Momenta’s generic
168
enoxaparin, and sales of generic enoxaparin are robust.
Table 1 summarizes other market share and price discount analyses generally based on selective aspects of the U.S. generic market.
Most notably, as part of the evaluation of the proposed legislation regarding biosimilars, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicted penetration ratios consistent with the analyses of complex
drugs in Figures 1 and 2, but expected a longer phase-in period for
169
biosimilar drugs.
By year four after market launch, the CBO expects a penetration rate of 35% with price discounts by biosimilars of
170
40%.
Other estimates on market penetration from a pharmacy
benefit management firm, Express Scripts, as well as by Avalere
Health, a consulting firm, tend to be somewhat higher than either
the Grabowski et al. or CBO values, with penetration in the 50% to
60% range, and somewhat higher discounts in the case of the Avalere
171
study (50% by year three).

165

Id.
See Generic Enoxaparin Questions and Answers, supra note 81.
167
The FDA has also reviewed Teva’s ANDA for generic enoxaparin and responded with a “Minor Deficiency” letter. Press Release, Teva, Teva Receives FDA Action
Letter
for
Generic
Lovenox
(Jan.
25,
2011),
available
at
http://www.tevapharm.com/pr/2011/pr_988.asp. Teva states that prior to final approval of its ANDA it needs to respond to a short list of questions contained on the
Minor Deficiency letter and that it plans to submit a response to the FDA in the near
future. Id.
168
According to analysts, Momenta’s generic enoxaparin generated $292 million
in sales in its first sixty-nine days on the market. See Generic Lovenox Feud Back in Spotlight, RTT NEWS (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.rttnews.com/content/topstories.aspx?
Id=1457134&pageNum=1.
169
See Cong. Budget Office, S. 1695 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act of 2007, at 7 (2008).
170
Id.
171
See infra tbl.1.
166
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TABLE 1
Biosimilar Competition U.S. Market Share and Price Discount Evidence
Peak Biosimilar
Penetration

Biosimilar Discount
to Pre-Entry Brand
Price

10% – 45%

10%–30%
(year 1)

Higher estimates
correspond to complex small molecules

10% (year 1)
35% (year 4)

20% (year 1)
40% (year 4)

Similar market situations

Express
Scripts
174
(2007)

49%

25% (year 1)

Therapeutic alternatives

Avalere
Health
175
(2007)

60%

20% (year 1)
51% (year 3)

Average small molecule generic drug
penetration rates

Source

Grabowski
172
(2007)

173

CBO (2008)

Basis

D. Empirical Evidence from Biosimilars in the European Union
Germany has exhibited the highest level of aggregate demand
176
for biosimilar products thus far.
Experience in other European
countries has been less strong. While evidence from experiences in
Germany or other European countries with biosimilar substitution
are not directly applicable to the U.S. market, given differences in the
markets and reimbursement systems, they nevertheless suggest that
over time significant biosimilar share is possible and payers, physi177
cians, and patients will accept biosimilars. In Germany, the biosimilar erythropoietin’s sales accounted for nearly 60% of total biosimilar
172

See Grabowski et al., supra note 89, at 9.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 169, at 7.
174
See STEVE MILLER & JONAH HOUTS, POTENTIAL SAVINGS OF BIOGENERICS IN THE
UNITED
STATES
2
(2007),
available
at
http://www.expressscripts.com/research/studies/pharmacybenefitresearch/specialtypharmacyservices/
docs/potentialSavingsBiogenericsUS.pdf.
175
See RONALD KING, AVALERE HEALTH, MODELING FEDERAL COST SAVINGS FROM
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS (2007), available at http://www.avalerehealth.net/
research/docs/Follow_on_Biologic_Modeling_Framework.pdf. Biosimilar penetration estimates are for the largest selling products. Avalere Health is conducting further analysis.
176
See Melanie Senior, European Biosimilars’ Market Performance Mirrors US Legislative
TODAY
(May
19,
2009),
Progress:
Slow
but
Steady,
BIOPHARMA
http://www.biopharmatoday.com/2009/05/european-biosimilars-marketperformance-mirrors-us-legislative-progress-slow-but-steady-.html.
177
TED BUCKLEY, BIOSIMILARS: THE POTENTIAL FOR THE U.S. MARKET 9–15 (2010).
173
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and reference product sales within two years of biosimilar launch;
biosimilar G-CSF’s accounted for almost 30% of combined biosimilar
178
reference product sales.
These biosimilars have been far less successful in France, however, where the biosimilar erythropoietin has
less than a 10% share and the biosimilar G-CSF has slightly less than a
179
20% share. Table 2 summarizes the biosimilar share experiences in
Germany and France. Germany’s diverse payer environment (where
there are hundreds of individual sickness funds) and relatively heavy
reliance on generic drugs may suggest greater parallels with the
United States. Future research comparing biosimilar market attitudes and experience in various European countries, the United
States, and the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) is
needed.
TABLE 2
180
Biosimilar Competition Germany and France Market Share Evidence
Biosimilar Shares

Share of Class
Germany
France

Share of Reference Product
Germany
France

Erythropoietin
Q4/07

3.0%

–

8.1%

–

Q1/09

27.2%

0.3%

55.1%

1.5%

Q4/09

28.2%

1.4%

58.3%

6.4%

G-CSFs
Q4/08

1.5%

–

1.8%

–

Q2/09

23.4%

3.6%

28.1%

4.9%

Q4/09

23.5%

13.0%

27.8%

17.8%

V. PROJECTED SAVINGS TO CONSUMERS
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the provisions
in the current health care law establishing a biosimilar pathway will
reduce federal budget deficits by $7 billion over the 2010 to 2019 pe178

Id. at 11–12; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, HOSPIRA RESPONSES TO FTC QUESTIONS
BIOSIMILARS (May 19, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
healthcarecompissues/090519hospirasupplementonbiosimilars.pdf (indicating that
one year following the launch of biosimilar EPO in Germany, the biosimilar had almost a fifty-percent share of the EPO market and the biosimilar was priced at a thirtyseven percent discount compared to the average brand price prior to biosimilar entry).
179
BUCKLEY, supra note 177, at 12–13.
180
See id. at 11–13.

ON
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181

riod. This finding is consistent with a 2008 CBO study of a similar
182
Senate bill, where it estimated a reduction in federal budget deficits
of $6.6 billion and a reduction in biologic drug spending of $25 bil183
lion for the 2009 to 2018 period. Over the full ten-year period, the
$25 billion in reduced biologic drug spending would account for
roughly 0.5% of national spending on prescription drugs, valued at
184
wholesale prices. The bulk of these estimated savings accrue in the
last five years of the ten-year time ranges analyzed. Savings beyond
the ten-year period may increase substantially as more biologics lose
patent and NBE-exclusivity protections, and as scientific advances are
made that both improve the ability to produce biosimilar versions of
185
innovative drugs and reduce the cost of developing biosimilars.
Over the next six years, a number of the largest selling biologic
products may face losses of some key patent and/or NBE-exclusivity
protections. Determining the effective patent expiry date for any given biologic is subject to interpretation, and opinions surely will differ
considerably for some patents and products. A number of significant
unknowns affect the precision of any such analysis, including the
identification of all the patents in the portfolio protecting an individual biologic, the strength of those patents in the face of challenges,
and the ability of biosimilar manufacturers to work around existing
186
patents. Based on a review of patent expiry information reported in
manufacturers’ financial reports and supplemented with additional
public information from academic literature, research reports, patent
filings, and court documents, the earliest publicly reported potential

181
Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Cong. Budget Office, to the Honorable
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf.
182
Both the current health care law and the earlier Senate bill (S. 1695) allow for
a twelve-year exclusivity period for the innovator biologic. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 169, at 4; see also 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 2010).
183
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 169, at 1.
184
Id. at 5.
185
See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 169. (estimates increase monotonically over time for the ten years projected from 2009 to 2018). The study identifies the increasing size of the biologic market at risk for biosimilar entry as one factor
contributing to increased cost savings over time. See id. The size of the biologic market at risk for biosimilar entry is likely to continue to grow following 2018, and, in
combination with technological advances for production of biosimilars and changes
in the market acceptance of biosimilars, may result in further increases in savings.
See id.
186
Henry Grabowski et al., Data Exclusivity for Biologics, 10 NAT. REVS. DRUGS
DISCOVERY 15, 15–16 (2011).
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patent expiry dates are reported in Table 3. We find that nine topselling biologic drugs approved through a BLA may experience the
loss of key patent protection by 2016. It is unknown when these biologics may experience biosimilar market entry under BPCIA, which
will depend on many technical, market, regulatory, and legal factors,
whether entry will be at risk, and the outcome of patent litigation that
188
is sure to ensue. Table 3 lists those nine biologics, their annual U.S.
sales as of 2009, and the year of the earliest publicly reported key pa189
tent expiry, as described above. The biologics that may face patent
expiry between 2012 and 2013 alone had combined 2009 U.S. revenues exceeding $10.4 billion.
TABLE 3
Earliest Publicly Reported Year of Potential Patent Expiry
190
for Selected Top-Selling Branded Biologics
Drug

Company

2009 U.S.
Sales ($Mil)

Earliest Publicly
Reported Year of
Key Patent Expiry

Enbrel

Amgen

$3,283

2012

Neupogen

Amgen

$901

2013

Epogen, Procrit

Amgen, J&J

191

Rebif

Merck Serono

Avonex

Biogen Idec

$3,827

2013–2015

$940

2013

$1,406

2013

187
Patent expiration dates are per the manufacturers’ Form 10-K and annual reports except in the cases of Rebif and Remicade, where the patent expiration dates
were not reported in the companies’ financial statements. For patent expiration
dates for both Rebif and Remicade, the authors relied on a report prepared for the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and confirmed those dates using
alternative publicly available sources. See LEWIN GROUP & i3 INNOVUS, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF AVAILABILITY OF FOLLOW-ON PROTEIN PRODUCTS (July 2009) (prepared for
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Planning and
Evaluation). Results have not been vetted with individual manufacturers. Results of
future patent litigation are unknown and projected dates may change.
188
Other top-selling biologic drugs, including Humalog, Novolog, and Lantus,
may lose protection from key patents by 2016, but were approved through NDAs.
189
Results have not been vetted with individual manufacturers. The results of future patent litigation are unknown, and therefore projected dates may change.
190
The potential year of patent expiry reflects company financial report disclosures when available and are supplemented with analyst reports and other public
sources. Results have not been vetted with individual manufacturers. Results of future patent litigation are unknown and projected dates may change. See also supra
note 187.
191
The BLA for Rebif received FDA approval in 2002, indicating that the 12-year
component of NBE exclusivity will end in 2014.
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Drug
192

Company

2009 U.S.
Sales ($Mil)

Earliest Publicly
Reported Year of
Key Patent Expiry

Remicade

Johnson & Johnson

$3,088

2014–2018

Neulasta

Amgen

$2,527

2015

193

Biogen Idec

$2,666

2015–2018

194

Abbott

$2,519

2016–2018

Rituxan
Humira

VI. INNOVATION INCENTIVES
As with the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress attempted to balance
the objectives of achieving cost savings from an abbreviated pathway
for biosimilars with preserving innovation incentives for new biologics. The law differs from Hatch-Waxman in the length of the exclusivity period for innovators: the BPCIA establishes twelve years after
the approval of an innovative biologic during which the FDA cannot
approve a biosimilar referencing it, versus the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which establishes five years after approval of a NCE during which an
abbreviated application for a generic drug referencing the NCE can195
not be submitted.
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the process
for resolving patent disputes is very different for biologics under the
BPCIA than for new chemical entities under Hatch-Waxman. This
Part considers the growing importance of biological innovation for
the healthcare sector, the innovation process in biotechnology, and
how the provisions of the new law are expected to affect innovation
incentives.
A. The Importance of Pharmaceutical Innovation
The biotech industry is a relatively new source of medical innovation with its first new drug product approvals coming in the early
1980s. It has, however, become a major source of novel drug introductions and overall industry growth in recent years. Grabowski and
Y. Richard Wang examined the quantity and quality of new drug introductions worldwide between 1982 and 2003 and found that biotech drugs are the fastest growing segment of new therapeutics, accounting for 4% of new drug introductions in the 1982 to 1992
192
The manufacturer relies on MAb technology that may be protected by Genentech’s Cabilly II patent until the year 2018, subject to ongoing litigation. The extent
to which licensing this MAb technology protects against biosimilar entry is uncertain.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (Supp. IV. 2010), with 35 U.S.C. §
156(d)(5)(E)(i) (Supp. IV 2010).
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196

period, but increasing to 16% in the 1993 to 2003 period.
U.S.
firms are the dominant source of biotech drugs, originating more
than half of all worldwide biopharmaceutical introductions from
197
1982 to 2003.
One of the key indicators of drug quality or novelty in the study
was whether the entity was a first-in-class introduction. New biological entities had a significantly higher likelihood of being a first-in198
class or novel introduction compared to new drug introductions.
New biologics have been particularly focused on oncology and immunology in recent years. In particular, the oncology class has recently experienced the introduction of breakthrough monoclonal antibodies and targeted biological agents resulting from increased
knowledge of the molecular mechanisms for cancer—these breakthrough products include rituximab (Rituxan), trastuzumab (Her199
ceptin), and bevacuzimab (Avastin).
Several new biological entities have had rapid diffusion and are
among the leading drug therapies in their class. Substantial improvements in survival, morbidity, and patients’ quality of life have
been documented in diseases previously resistant to successful treatment, including cancers such as aggressive HER-2 positive breast can200
cer.
Improvements were also made in the prevention of disease
progression, functional decline, joint destruction, and disability asso201
ciated with rheumatoid arthritis.
The prospects of future advances are further enhanced by a robust pipeline of more than 600 biotech drugs under development in
202
a variety of therapeutic areas.
These include novel approaches to

196
Henry Grabowski et al., The Quantity and Quality of Worldwide New Drug Introductions 1992-2003, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 452, 458 (2006).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Economics of New Oncology Drug
Development, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 209, 214–15 (2007).
200
Ian Smith et al., 2-Year Follow-Up of Trastuzumab After Adjuvant Chemotherapy in
HER2-Positive Breast Cancer: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 369 THE LANCET 29, 33
(2007).
201
See generally A.L. Weaver, The Impact of New Biologicals in the Treatment of Rheumatoid Arthritis, 43 RHEUMATOLOGY iii17 (2004) (describing studies on the impact of biologics in the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis).
202
See PhRMA, 2008 REPORT: MEDICINES IN DEVELOPMENT—BIOTECHNOLOGY:
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH CONTINUES TO BOLSTER ARSENAL AGAINST DISEASE WITH 633
MEDICINES IN DEVELOPMENT 1 (2008), available at http://www.phrma.org/
sites/default/files/422/biotech2008.pdf.
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conditions with large unmet medical need and societal disease bur203
dens, including more than 250 biotech drugs for cancer alone.
John Calfee and Elizabeth DuPré have identified two important
204
features of competition involving new biological entities. First, after
proof of principle has been established for a new biological, multiple
therapeutic interventions are possible in the biological cascade of
proteins that often influence the same ultimate target (e.g., a particu205
lar receptor or dysfunctional enzyme).
In the case of Herceptin,
for example, in 2008 there were fifty-one molecular targeted therapies in Phase II or III trials for breast cancer, many targeting the
HER-2 receptor, other members of the HER family, or one of the
206
other proteins downstream from HER-2. The tumor necrosis factor
inhibitors for rheumatoid arthritis and the angiogenesis inhibiting
drugs for cancer are also experiencing similar forms of competition
involving the same-targeted pathways, but with different specific
207
modes of action.
A second important feature of competition for new biological
entities involves new indications associated with the same or related
208
pathways.
For example, drugs initially approved for rheumatoid
arthritis have been, or are being, investigated for a number of antiinflammatory conditions that may be related to the same dysfunctional pathway. Two of the leading rheumatoid arthritis drugs have
already received subsequent approval for psoriasis (Enbrel) and
209
Crohn’s disease (Remicade). Michael Flanagan finds that as of the
mid-2000s Avastin had 15 Phase III and 105 Phase II clinical trials in
progress for more than twenty different types of cancer and different
210
stages of cancer.

203

Id.
John E. Calfee & Elizabeth DuPré, The Emerging Market Dynamics of Targeted Therapeutics, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 1302, 1305–06 (2006).
205
Id. at 1306.
206
DATAMONITOR, PIPELINE INSIGHT: BREAST CANCER—RECENT APPROVALS INCREASE
PRESSURE ON PIPELINE CANDIDATES 4 (Apr. 2008); see generally Laura Tookman & Rebecca Roylance, New Drugs for Breast Cancer, 96 BRIT. MED. BULL. 111 (2010) (discussing the targeted drug therapies for HER-2 positive breast cancer, including trastuzumab).
207
DATAMONITOR, PIPELINE INSIGHT: DISEASE MODIFICATION IN RHEUMATOID
ARTHRITIS—NEW DRUG TARGETS COMPETE IN CROWDED MARKET 67 (Oct. 2009).
208
Calfee & DuPré, supra note 204, at 1306.
209
Id. at 1307.
210
M. Flanagan, Avastin’s Progression, BIOCENTURY, March 6, 2006, at A4.
204
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B. NBE Exclusivity and Patent Protection
The process of discovering and developing a new biologic is a
long, costly, and risky venture. Joseph DiMasi and Grabowski have
estimated that the development of a typical new biologic costs $1.2
211
billion in capitalized R&D costs.
This compares with an earlier
212
study of the cost of an NCE, estimated at roughly $800 million.
DiMasi and Grabowski found that biologics cost more in the discovery
phase, take longer to develop, and require greater capital investment
213
in manufacturing plants. They found that the probability of success
is higher for biologics than NCEs, but biologics that fail do so later in
214
the R&D life cycle. After adjustment for inflation and the different
time periods studied, the cost of developing a biologic and an NCE
215
are roughly comparable in value.
The development of new medicines requires large and risky upfront capital investments. Intellectual property protection in the
form of patents and exclusivity provisions in the BPCIA and Hatch
Waxman Acts (“NBE/NCE exclusivity periods”) are the primary policy instruments used in the United States with the aim of allowing investors to recoup sufficient profits from successful innovations to en216
courage risky investment in R&D for new medicines.
NBE/NCE
exclusivity and patents have separate but complementary roles. The
U.S. government awards patents for inventions based on well-known
217
criteria: novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. Patents are the main
policy instrument for encouraging invention of, and innovation in,
new products in the U.S. economy. NBE/NCE exclusivity, including
data exclusivity, which protects investment in safety and efficacy data
from use or reference by others in their abbreviated applications for
a period of time, and market exclusivity, which prohibits competitors
from marketing for a period of time, recognizes that after invention—typically before clinical trials—a long, risky, and costly R&D
process remains in the United States for the development of new

211

Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is
Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 475 (2007).
212
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003).
213
DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 211, at 473, 477.
214
Id. at 472, 473 fig.1.
215
Id. at 477.
216
Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NAT. REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 479–87 (2008); see also
Grabowski et al., supra note 186, at 15–16.
217
Grabowski, supra note 216, at 479.
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218

medicines.
Effective patent life is often uncertain because significant patent time elapses before FDA approval and because there is
219
uncertainty associated with the resolution of any patent challenges.
As a result, NBE/NCE exclusivity provides a more predictable period
of protection. It essentially acts as an “insurance policy” in instances
where patents are narrow, uncertain, or near expiry.
The protection afforded by NBE exclusivity may be particularly
important for innovation incentives in biologics because some have
asserted that patents in biologics may be either narrower in scope
than those for small-molecule drugs or potentially at greater risk of
220
being successfully challenged or circumvented. Biologics often rely
221
only on formulation, or process, patents.
Given that a biosimilar
will be slightly different in its composition and/or manufacturing
process, a court may determine that it does not infringe the innova222
tor’s patent.
This has the potential to lead to a seemingly contradictory outcome where a biosimilar may be “different enough” not to
infringe the innovator’s patents, but, on the other hand, it may be
“similar enough” to qualify for approval through an abbreviated ap223
proval pathway.
C. Economic Insights Regarding a Reasonable NBE Exclusivity Period
The new law grants twelve years of exclusivity for innovative biologics during which the FDA may not approve biosimilars referencing them, compared to five years of exclusivity for NCEs under the
Hatch-Waxman Act during which an abbreviated application referencing them cannot be submitted (plus a stay on generic entry of up
to thirty months when there is a patent challenge to allow for resolu224
tion of litigation). By contrast, the European Union (EU) has harmonized across member states a ten-year exclusivity period for both

218

See generally id. at 479–87.
Id. at 479.
220
See e.g., Bruce S. Manheim Jr. et al., ‘Follow-On Biologics’: Ensuring Continued
Innovation in the Biotechnology Industry, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 394, 398–99 (2006).
221
See id. at 400.
222
Id. at 398–400.
223
Id. at 401.
224
See BPCIA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010); Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98
Stat. 1585; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: COURT
DECISIONS, ANDA APPROVALS, AND 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm072868.pdf.
219
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NCEs and NBEs.
The EU also provided for an additional year of
exclusivity for entities with significant new indications that are approved within the first eight years after the original molecule’s ap226
proval.
The NBE-exclusivity period was the focus of substantial debate
by legislators, the 111th Congress considered bills with exclusivity pe227
riods ranging from five to fourteen years.
To provide economic
analysis to support the consideration of NBE-exclusivity periods, Grabowski developed a breakeven financial analysis using historical data
on R&D costs and revenues for new biologics and the risk-adjusted
228
market return on investment in the industry. Under this model, a
representative portfolio of biologic candidates would be expected to
“break even” (or recover the average costs of development, manufacturing, promotion, and the industry’s cost of capital) between 12.9
229
and 16.2 years after launch.
This analysis provided support for a
NBE-exclusivity period at the longer end of the spectrum considered
by legislators. It should be noted that NBE exclusivity only extends
overall market exclusivity for the molecule when effective patent lifetimes are either expected to be relatively limited (because of a longer-than-average development path) or vulnerable to patent challenges or “work arounds” (given the potentially narrower scope of
many biologic patents). NBE exclusivity, thus, serves as an “insurance
policy” to maintain incentives for the development of promising therapeutic candidates in cases where patent protection is inadequate
because of these circumstances.
In a 2009 report, the Federal Trade Commission saw little need
for a NBE-exclusivity period, claiming that patents alone should be
230
sufficient to encourage biologic innovation in most circumstances.
Furthermore, the report argued that even when effective patent life
was limited, early-mover competitive advantages should be sufficient
to maintain innovation incentives, given relatively few expected biosimilar entrants, physician loyalty to the brand, and the likelihood

225
EMA, Pre and Post-Authorisation Procedural Advice, Human Medicines, EMEA No.
CHMP/225411/2006 (July 2, 2008), available at http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/
files/EMA%20Regulatory%20and%20Procedural%20Guidance.pdf.
226
Grabowski, supra note 216, at 479.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 479–88.
229
Id. at 486.
230
See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON
BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf.
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that biosimilars will not be interchangeable with the originator’s
231
brand, as is the case with generic drugs.
To evaluate these claims, Grabowski, Long, and Mortimer, in a
232
recent paper, extend the original model in a number of directions.
First, they examine how substantial brand retention of revenues after
biosimilar entry affects breakeven lifetimes for innovators, assuming
different market exclusivity periods. Second, using a Monte Carlo
simulation approach, they examine the interaction between a NBEexclusivity period and patent protection under different scenarios to
highlight the circumstances where each is important in maintaining
233
innovation incentives. An advantage of this simulation approach is
that it allows one to consider variations in several of the model’s core
parameters simultaneously, such as the contribution margin and cost
of capital as well as the innovator’s share and price.
The results of this new analysis are generally consistent with
Congress’s determination that a NBE-exclusivity period that includes
twelve years during which FDA may not approve a biosimilar to the
innovative reference biologic, appropriately balances objectives for
potential cost savings from biosimilar-price competition with long-run
234
incentives for investment in innovative biologics.
They find that
when biologic patents are relatively less certain and expected to have
shorter effective lifetimes, a NBE-exclusivity period including twelve
235
years greatly enhances investment incentives. On the other hand, if
biologic patents provide relatively strong protection with significant
effective patent life remaining at approval, patents alone will be suffi236
cient to maintain investment incentives in most cases. In those instances, however, the NBE-exclusivity period has only a minimal effect on the timing of potential biosimilar entry and consequently, on
237
health care costs.
One interesting question for future research is the impact disparate exclusivity periods for NCEs and NBEs will have on innovation
incentives. As noted, biologic introductions and sales revenues have
been growing rapidly over the last decade, and biologics have an in231

Id. at iii–vi.
Grabowski et al., supra note 186, at 15.
233
In their paper, Grabowski, Long, and Mortimer use the term “data-exclusivity
period” to represent the same concept as the term “NBE-exclusivity period” used in
this Article.
234
Id. at 16.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
232
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creasing presence in R&D pipelines. It remains an open question
whether the longer period for NBE-exclusivity compared to NCE exclusivity will further tilt R&D incentives toward large molecules and
whether Congress should revisit the NCE-exclusivity period and consider harmonizing these periods, as is currently the case in the EU.
D. The Resolution of Patent Challenges
One of the most important developments under the HatchWaxman generic drug framework became the importance of the paragraph IV 180-day exclusivity provisions, under which generic manufacturers could challenge the legitimacy of branded manufacturers’
238
patents or claim that generic entry would not infringe them. Over
time, as the law and economic benefits to generics were established,
the likelihood of paragraph IV challenges increased and most drugs
239
became subject to challenges.
In designing the patent disclosure
provisions of the new law for biologics, Congress attempted to reduce
the uncertainty and economic costs associated with litigation, but it
remains to be seen what the eventual effects may be and whether this
objective will be met.
Under the new law, an abbreviated application for a biosimilar
240
can be filed after four years. The filing of an application triggers a
series of potentially complex private information exchanges among
the biosimilar applicant, reference product sponsor, and patent own241
ers.
These exchanges of information are followed by negotiations
and a process for instituting litigation on the core patents when necessary. Congress has crafted these patent provisions while eliminating the incentive for litigation associated with a 180-day exclusivity
period for the first filer in a successful challenge, as well as the auto242
matic thirty-month stay on entry in Hatch-Waxman.
By instituting
this potentially very complex structured process for biologics, the
hope is that patent disputes will be resolved prior to the expiration of
the twelve-year NBE-exclusivity period so that biosimilars can enter in
a timely fashion. Whether these rules will achieve their intended effects remains unknown. Some companies have indicated that they
may find it more attractive to develop evidence to support a full BLA,
238
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1586.
239
See Berndt et al., supra note 154, at 791.
240
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B) (Supp. IV 2010).
241
§ 262(l).
242
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585.
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rather than an abbreviated biosimilar application, which would
avoid the information disclosures about manufacturing process and
244
formulations under the patent challenge provisions. In some cases,
pursuing a full BLA instead of an abbreviated application would also
allow companies to come to market in advance of the required
245
twelve-year NBE-exclusivity period for the reference product.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The BPCIA established an abbreviated pathway for biosimilars
that is expected to lead to a number of competitors for several leading biologic products over the next decade. In contrast to generic
competition, there are likely to be fewer entrants into the market for
particular molecules initially due to higher development, approval,
and production costs, up to $150 million for very complex biolog246
247
ics, compared to only a few million for generic drugs.
In addition, many biosimilars are likely to be therapeutic alternatives rather
than therapeutic equivalents (i.e., they will not be rated as interchan248
geable by the FDA).
The penetration of the market will also be
tempered by the reluctance of many physicians and patients to switch
to biosimilars until experience in clinical settings has been established. This is likely to be particularly true for existing patients that
are responding well to maintenance therapy on the reference product as well as for patients with a limited therapeutic window for suc249
cessful response (e.g., certain cancer patients).
Therapeutic areas
with serious clinical and economic consequences associated with loss
243
See, e.g., Sandoz Will Steer Clear of U.S. Biosimilars Pathway, Use Other Applications,
PINK SHEET, May 3, 2010, available at http://sis.windhover.com/buy/
abstract.php?id=00720180006&utm_source=toc&utm_medium=website.
244
Michael McCaughan, Follow-On Biologics: Is There a Pathway?, IN VIVO BLOG (May
20, 2010, 5:30 PM), http://invivoblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/follow-on-biologics-isthere-pathway.html.
245
Id.
246
Ludwig Burger, Battle over Biosimilar Drugs is Only for the Brave, REUTERS (July 2,
2010),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE66102R20100702?rpc=401&feed
Type=RSS&feedName=stocksNews&rpc=401.
247
See Reiffen & Ward, supra note 64, at 6.
248
See, for example, the transcripts from the FDA two-day public hearing on “Approval Pathway for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biologic Products Public Meeting.” FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. HEARING, supra note 30.
249
See supra Part III.B. In some therapeutic areas (e.g., immunology, oncology)
physicians are unlikely to switch a patient who is responding well to a particular therapy. Similarly, the physician may have greater confidence initiating a new patient on
therapies with which they have substantial experience. In the case of biosimilars it
will take some time for physicians to gain experience with those particular therapies
and consequently impact their choice of therapy.
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of clinical effectiveness and low patient turnover are likely to experience lower rates of biosimilar penetration compared to those therapeutic areas with higher percentages of new patients—particularly,
therapeutically vulnerable patients may be less likely to be prescribed
250
biosimilars. One pivotal factor affecting the degree of entry and
price competition will be the FDA requirements to receive approval
as a biosimilar. Based on preliminary statements from the FDA, regulatory requirements are likely to proceed on a case-by-case basis that
is science-driven and subject to change over time as the science and
251
technology evolves.
Since the biosimilar industry is global and
there are already biosimilars present in Europe for some leading biologic products, the extent to which foreign trials and experience are
accepted by the FDA, including when the reference products differ
from those in the United States, could also be an important determinant of how many biosimilars enter the U.S. market and the corresponding extent of biosimilar competition.
Another pivotal factor affecting biosimilar penetration involves
the reimbursement procedures and financial incentives employed by
both government and private payers to encourage biosimilar utiliza252
tion.
In the case of self-injectable drugs typically managed as part
of the pharmacy benefit, more cost-sensitive Medicare Part D and
commercial plans are likely to employ a number of existing techniques to encourage biosimilars, including tiered formularies, prior
authorization, and step-therapy requirements. In the case of biologics dispensed in physician clinics and hospitals, as infused or physician-supervised injected therapies, and typically managed as part of
the medical benefit, ASP-based reimbursement algorithms under
Medicare Part B and commercial plans will influence physician adop253
tion of lower cost biosimilars. The statutory provision setting the six

250

Physicians may be all the more hesitant to experiment with a biosimilar rather
than use a branded biologic, with which they have a great deal of experience, if even
small differences between the brand and the biosimilar could lead to important impacts on patient health. See supra Part III.B.
251
See supra text accompanying note 42.
252
Reimbursement procedures that increase the cost of the branded biologic to
the patient (e.g., coinsurance payments or copayments), constrain physician prescribing (e.g., step therapy, prior-authorization requirements), or impact the financial incentives for physicians to select one therapy over another (e.g., limitations and
regulations on physicians ability to buy-and-bill infused agents) can all influence the
choice of therapy and the resulting biosimilar penetration. See supra Part III.C.
253
Physicians may earn a margin on physician administered drugs through “buy
and bill” reimbursement policies and procedures. To the extent that reimbursement
policies provide financial incentives for the physician to use either the biosimilar or
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percent of Medicare Part B reimbursement at an equivalent amount
for both the biosimilar and the reference product will help to mitigate provider disincentives for biosimilar adoption. In addition,
movement away from historical “buy and bill” physician reimbursement arrangements, including requirements that certain drugs be
managed and delivered through specialty pharmacy providers, is also
likely to have an important effect on the utilization of biosimilars.
Coverage decisions and requirements at the regional level by Medicare contractors also could be important considerations.
The new law is designed to balance the objectives of achieving
cost savings in the current period, and preserving incentives for continued innovation in the future. A number of leading biologic products with significant sales in the United States are expected to experience some patent expiration in the next decade, so cost savings
could grow to meaningful values depending on how other factors
such as regulation, reimbursement, and intellectual property litiga254
tion play out over this period.
In terms of maintaining incentives for future innovation, the law
provides for a NBE-exclusivity period in which a biosimilar can be
approved utilizing an abbreviated pathway—sooner than twelve years
255
following approval of the innovator product.
NBE exclusivity provides an important “insurance policy” to the patent system and could
be important in the case of biologics where patents may prove to be
narrower in scope than those for new chemical entities or easier to
circumvent. Analysis of a portfolio of representative biological products indicates that twelve years or more of market exclusivity from patents or NBE exclusivity is generally necessary to achieve breakeven
returns that provide a risk-adjusted return on capital and R&D investments.
A number of important issues remain for future research, including how the new law will affect industry structure and incentives
for undertaking R&D for biologics versus new chemical entities. As
was the case with the Hatch-Waxman Act, change may be gradual at
first, but over time the new law could lead to profound changes in the
economics and organization of the biopharmaceutical industry.

the brand, this may impact the physician’s choice of therapy and the resulting rate of
biosimilar penetration. See supra text accompanying notes 101–114.
254
See supra tbl.3 (illustrating biologics with combined 2009 U.S. revenues exceeding $11.5 billion for which some key patents may expire by the end of 2013, including Enbrel, Neupogen, Epogen/Procrit, Rebif, and Avonex).
255
See supra text accompanying note 224.

